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Depuis ces cinquante dernieres annees, la loi americaine s'est transformee. Avant cela, les relations 
familiales, comme la relation parent-enfant, etaient clairement definies par la biologie ou l'adoption. Le 
mariage etait defini par Ie genre. Les actes de mariage et les actes de naissance etaient la preuve d'un statut 
juridique. La transformation observee est nee de la reconnaissance par la loi de la rea lite selon laquelle les 
relations familiales peuvent se developper sans forma lites. Aujourd'hui, il n'est plus possible de dire si l'on 
se trouve dans un certain statut juridique ou pas. Des relations semblables au mariage ont ete reconnues, 
comme les unions civiles, de la meme maniere que s'est developpee, avec les familles recomposees la 
condition de « parent de facto ». 
La loi americaine reconnait maintenant que Ie mariage est en pleine evolution et pas une institution 
statique. Elle reconnait egalement que l'adoption est aussi une institution en evolution n'excluant plus les 
parents biologiques de la relation. Par essence, dans la loi americaine il y a eu une reconnaissance des 
changements qui ont eu lieu tant au niveau de la societe qu'au niveau de la science. Cette reconnaissance 
se concentre toujours sur la famille, definie de fa~ons multiples. ('est la famille qui est l'unite dans la 
societe, con~ue pour assurer la continuite de la civilisation. 
Summary : 
Within the last fifty years, a transformation has taken place in American law. Before then, family 
relationships, like parent-child relationship, were clearly defined by biology or adoption. Marriage was 
defined by gender. Marriage certificates and birth certificates evidenced one's legal status. The transforma-
tion that has occurred was the legal recognition that took reality into account that relationships can develop 
without formalities. No longer can it be said that either one is in a certain status or one is not. Marriage-like 
relationships have been recognized, like civil unions, as well as de facto parenthood. 
American law has now recognized that marriage is an evolving, not a static institution with some 
jurisdictions no longer defining the status in terms of gender, that adoption is also an evolving institution, 
no longer excluding birth parents from the relationship. In essence, in American law there has been a 
recognition of the changes that have taken place both in society and science. This recognition still focuses on 
the family, defined in a multiple ways. It is the family which is the unit in society designed to insure the 
continuation of the civilization. 
1 - In American law, the family is not considered a legal unit 
like a corporation or a labor union, but a constellation of re la-
tionships I ike spouse and spouse, parent (whether de facto or de 
jure, birth or adoptive) and child, grandparent and grandchi ld, 
and sibling and sibling. For many years, both the study of and the 
legal practice that affected those relationships were called 
domestic relations, which was a more accurate description of the 
area than the present label of family law. At the close of the twen-
tieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, a great 
transformation took place in American fami ly law. Traditional 
approaches to establishing, maintaining and reorganizing 
husband and wife and parent and child relationships were 
examined and in some instances replaced w ith new ways ofthin-
king and new laws. These new laws have taken into account 
changes in socia l mores and the lessening of taboos of certain 
subjects, like illegitimacy and cohabitation without marriage, as 
well as developments in science, especially in the area of assisted 
reproduction technology. 
2 - Perhaps the most important case to be decided during that 
period was Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 1, in 
which the Supreme Judicial Court, the highest court in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the oldest state supreme 
court, sanctioned same-sex marriage. In his concurring opinion 
in that case, Justice Greany stated that " the right to marry is not 
a privi lege conferred by the State, but a fundamental right that 
1. 798 NE2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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is protected against unwarranted State interference" 2. The court 
defined marriage as a " vital social institution " representing the 
" exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other " that 
" nurtures love ", " mutual support ", and " brings stab ility to our 
society" 3. The government's position on limiting marriage to a 
man and a woman included the argument that procreation 
within marriage is a desirable social goal and a same-sex couple 
could not further that goal. A majority of the justices on the court 
found that rationale for limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
unjustifiable because" the exclusive and permanent commit-
ment of the marriage partners to one another, not the begetti ng 
of children, ... is the sine qua non of civ il marriage" 4. In addi-
tion, same-sex couples may achieve the goal of estab lishing a 
parent-child relationship through adoption and new techniques 
in assisted reproduction. Also, two individuals over the age of 
fertility are not restricted from obtaining a marriage license. 
3 - Two years earlier, in 2001, the Supreme Judicia l Court of 
Massachusetts was confronted with the question of whose name 
should appear on a birth certificate when the woman who gave 
birth to the infant was not genetically related to that infant but 
merely a gestational carrier. In the case of Culliton v. Beth Israel 
Deaconess Medical Centre 5 the gestational carrier agreed to 
have implanted in her uterus embryos that were created from the 
sperm of Steven Culliton and the ova of Marla Culliton, to carry 
and deliver any child or children resulting from the embryo 
implantation and to permit Mr. and Mrs. Culliton to have sole 
physica l and legal custody of the child or children born to the 
carrier. The question presented to the court was novel and the 
Supreme Judicial Court could not rely on any judiCial precedent 
or legislation directly on point. It therefore decided on its own 
that Mr. and Mrs. Culliton, the genetically related parents of the 
twin children born to the gestational carrier were the children 's 
legal parents and their names should appear on the birth certi-
ficates. 
4 - A year before Goodridge, the same court was asked to 
decide a case, Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security 6, 
which raised the question of whether posthumously born twin 
girls could qualify as dependents under the federal socia l secu-
rity laws and thus receive benefits. The unusual aspect of the case 
was that the children 's father had his sperm" banked" while he 
was undergoing treatment for cancer. He ultimately died and 
after his death his widow was artificially inseminated with his 
sperm. She became pregnant and gave birth to twins two years 
after her husband died. There was no question that the twins 
were the children of their mother's husband. Under federal law, 
the determination of inheritance rights is a state matter and, while 
originally the case was brought in the federal courts after the 
mother had exhausted her administrative remedy (the Social 
Security Administration had rejected her claim on the ground 
that the mother had not established that the twins were her 
husband's" children "), the case was transferred to the state's 
highest court. The Supreme Judicial Court stated the issue: " We 
have been asked to determine the inheritance ri ghts under 
Massachusetts law of children conceived from the gametes of a 
deceased individual and his or her surviving spouse" 7. The 
court held that the posthumously conceived twin girls were the 
children of the decedent and qualified as his issue. In her conclu-
ding statement, the Chief Justice wrote: 
2. Id. at 970. 
3. Id. at 948. 
4.ld.at961. 
5 . 756NE21133(Mass. 2001) . 
6. 760 NE 2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
7. Id. at261. 
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"[W]e conc lude that limited circumstances may exist, 
consistent with the mandates of our Legislature, in which posthu-
mously conceived children may enjoy the inheritance rights of 
« issue» under our intestacy law. These limited circumstances 
exist where, as a threshold matter, the surviving parent or the 
child's other legal representative demonstrates a genetic rela-
tionship between the child and the decedent. The survivor or 
representative must then estab li sh both that the decedent affir-
matively consented to posthumous conception and to the 
support of any resulting chi ld . Even where such circumstances 
exist, time limitations may preclude commencing a claim for 
succession rights on behalf of a posthumously conceived child. 
In any action brought to estab l ish such inheritance rights, notice 
must be given to al l interested parties" 8. 
5 - What do these seemingly disparate cases have in common? 
O n one level each case represents the highest court in Massachu-
setts breaking new ground by recognizing changes in social atti-
tudes and the developments in the sc ience of artificial reproduc-
tive technology. On another leve l, the cases represent a judicial 
preference for estab lishing spousal and parental relationships 
even when this involves creati ng new law. In each case, the 
result of estab lishing those relationships was the formation of 
unconventional family units. 
6 - The formation and recognition of a traditional fami ly unit 
- husband and wife, and parent and child - has been a policy in 
the United States for years, although it may not always have been 
articu lated. The reasons for the policy vary and may include the 
natural desire to mate and a desire to live in a closely knit unit 
with shared values, economic and/or emotional interde-
pendency and as an appropriate setting for begetting and raising 
healthy children for the sake of future generations. But tradition 
has given way to changing social mores and that change has 
been reflected in the law. 
1. Marriage-like and Marriage 
Relationships 
7 - According to the latest data from the American govern-
ment's Census Bureau, married couples represent less than 48 
percent of American households in 2010. That figure represents 
a drop of 30 percent compared with the data in 1950 9 . Thus 52 
percent of American households are no longer comprised of the 
traditional model. For example, the households may be based on 
non-marital cohabitation or a single woman without a husband 
or a single man without a wife but with a child. There may be a 
variety of sociologica l exp lanations, for example, the decline in 
the reverence for marriage, the changing roles of men and 
women in society, the erratic nature of employment opportuni-
ties and the decline in incomes. 
8 - Non-marital cohabitation surely existed in 1950 but it did 
not have either the soc ial or lega l acceptance it now enjoys, 
mainly because of the rad ica l change that occurred in 1976 
when the California Supreme Court decided Marvin v. Marvin' 0. 
In that case the highest court in California decided that at the 
termination of a cohabitation arrangement, the aggrieved party, 
whether man or woman, had a remedy either in law or equity 
depending on the particular facts. For example, if the aggrieved 
party could prove that the couple had entered into a formal 
contract to regulate their relationship, he or she cou ld sue for 
breach of contract. Or, if the conduct of the parties implied a 
8. Id. at 272. 
9. Sabina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds: 
The New York Times, May 26,20 II at 22. 
10. 557 P.2d 106 (Ca l. 1976). 
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contract, he or she could sue for breach of an implied contract 
as well. Further, an equitable remedy like quantum merit, 
constructive trust, or resulting trust could be applied if the facts 
supported it. 
9 - With the lifting of the social taboo against contract cohabi-
tation and the availability of a legal remedy at termination, in a 
certain sense contract cohabitation has become an alternative 
to marriage. Indeed, registered domestic partnerships and civil 
unions that are available in some American jurisdictions, like 
Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington are predicated on 
the legal recognition of contract cohabitation. But contract coha-
bitation is an alternative to marriage - not a substitute for 
marriage - for people who do not want the kind of individual 
responsibilities and obligations marriage requires, and those 
imposed by the state 11. 
10 - In a formal cohabitation contract, a couple may decide 
between themselves what role each will play and what kind of 
obligations will attach to their relationship. But the important 
limitation to such a contract is that it cannot bind third parties. 
For example, a couple may promise each other to be loyal and 
to refrain from revealing their secrets, but should one of the 
parties in a cohabitation contract be sued, that promise does not 
provide him or her with the same evidentiary protections 
enjoyed by a married couple. 
11 - Studies have shown that there is a major difference 
between cohabiting couples and their married counterparts in 
terms of who they are and how they view their relationship 12. 
These studies indicate that in terms of age, cohabitants tend to 
be younger ; in terms of economic stability, cohabitants tend to 
be less economically secure, perhaps because they tend to be 
less educated. Valuing independence and personal happiness, 
cohabiting couples tend to live separate economic lives and 
seem to be less committed to their relationship than a married 
coup le. Those characteristics carryover to their attitude toward 
their children who seem to experience greater financial, physi-
ca l and educational risks than children of married couples. 
12 - A major difference between contract cohabitation and 
marriage is in the legal treatment of children. Unless there is a 
statute in the jurisdiction declaring all children legitimate, child-
ren born to a cohabiting couple, whether there is a formal 
contract or not, is not legitimate. That would mean that the father 
of the child would have to take some formal legal action to 
acquire paternal rights and the mother of the child would also 
have to take formal action to acquire a support obligation on the 
part of the father. For example, the father of the child would have 
to become a co-guardian of the child to secure custodial rights . 
Short of some legal action, the cohabitation arrangement would 
not create a secure family unit. Unless legislation that creates 
civil unions provides legal protection for children, civil unions 
fai I as substitutes for marriage. 
11 . For a full discussion of the legal aspects of nontraditional families, like contract 
cohabitation, civil unions and registered domestic partnerships, see Ira Mark 
Ellman, Paul M. Kuru, Lois A. Weithorn, Brian H. Bix, Karen Czapanskiy and 
Maxine Eichner: Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 917-1 123(5th ed. 
2010). 
12. Professor Marsha Garrison has written extensively about the comparison 
between marriage and cohabitation, citing empirica l studies to support her 
conclusions and the statements in this article. See Marsha Garrison, Is 
Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Lawof Cohabitant Obli-
gations : 52 UCLA L. Rev. 815 (2005). - Marsha Garrison, Marriage Matters: 
What's Wrong with the ALI's Domestic Partnership Proposal in Reconceiving 
the Family: Critique on the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution 305 (Robin H. Wilson ed., 2006). - Marsha Garrison, 
Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation: 42 Fam. 
L. Q. 309 (2008) . 
13 - Children are protected in marriage by the state laws that 
are designed to further the best interests of children in a variety 
of ways. And, where there are no specific laws, common law 
protections fill in the gaps. Perhaps the most important laws that 
protect children are found in state decedents estates statutes. 
American decedents estates statutes that regulate inheritance are 
based on the English model which were designed to respect and 
protect family ties, especial ly biological ties. 
2. Parent-Child Relationship 
14 - Parenthood within marriage has been the traditional 
model for the establishment of the family in American law. 
However, throughout history men have fathered children outside 
of marriage and both the father and the children have been 
discriminated against both socially and legally. As stated above, 
this discrimination was and is clearly manifested in decedents 
estates laws. Fathers of illegitimate children have also been 
discriminated against in custody disputes and adoption. In adop-
tion, the father was often considered a shadow figure, often disre-
garded, and not notified when his child was relinquished for 
adoption. The discrimination was probably based on the social 
policy of discouraging out of wedlock births and promoting 
family units based on marriage. 
15 - In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. illi-
nois 13 recognized that a family unit could be based on informal 
cohabitation, and a father of children born to an unmarried coha-
biting couple could have certain rights. In Stanley, after the child-
ren's birth mother had died, the children automatically became 
wards of the State of Illinois and that state's protection agency 
removed the three children from Mr. Stanley's care. In Illinois an 
i Ilegiti mate father was presumed to be unfit without any previous 
hearing that had determined that fact. That Mr. Stanley had fathe-
red the three children during the 18 years in which he had lived 
intermittently with the children's mother was irrelevant. Mr. 
Stanley's argument that a father of illegitimate children was 
presumed unfit because he had not married the children's 
mother deprived him of the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Mr. Stanley argued that fathers of illegitimate children 
should not be treated differently from fathers of legitimate child-
ren in terms of being notified and given an opportunity to be 
heard in any proceeding that would determine their children's 
custody. And he won his point. 
16 - Stanley v. Illinois represents not only a victory for unwed 
fathers who seek to be heard in any custody dispute and adop-
tion proceeding, but it also represents the United States Supreme 
Court's recognition of family ties even in a family not based on 
marriage. In a series of cases concerning unwed fathers, the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed its stand that the existence 
of a paternal relationship is the important element in an unwed 
father's claim to be legally recognized as a parent 14. The pater-
13.405 US 645 (1972). 
14. Stanley v. Illinois and other United States Supreme Court cases dealing with 
the rights of unwed fathers is discussed in Sanford N. Katz: Family Law in 
America 153-54 (2003) . - See also Wa lter 0. Weyrauch, Sanford N. Katz, 
Frances O lsen: Cases and Materials on Family Law: Legal Concepts and 
Changing Human Relationships 78-B3 (1994). - Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers 
and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers: 54 Emory 
L./. 127 (2005). - David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition : 
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood: 
54 Am. ]. Compo L. 125, 128-29 (2006 Supp.). - David D. Meyer, The 
Constitutionalization of Family Law: 42 Fam. L. Q. 529, 542 (2008). -
Although Stanley concerned providing an unwed father notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in a dependency hearing, the United States Supreme Court 
referred to the adoption proceeding as well in footnote 9. 
1 
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nal relationship is first based on biology, and secondly on the 
assumption of parental responsibilities either individually or 
shared with the child's mother 15. 
17 - The United States Supreme Court has respected the exis-
tence of on-going families and has been reluctant to allow any 
legal interference with that family unit even where the family unit 
was not based on biology. In Michael H. v. Gerald D. 16, a plura-
lity of the justices in a complex set of opinions protected the inte-
grity of the marital family even where the child in that family was 
the result of the child's mother being impregnated not by her 
husband but by another man . The ultimate outcome of the case 
was to deprive the biological father of his privacy protection in 
his relationship with his child. He had failed to assert his pater-
nity claim within two years of the child's birth, which was the 
law in California. The case resulted in a victory for the on-going 
family unit. In a certain sense, the de facto family trumped 
biology. 
18 - However, in the context of child protection cases, the inte-
grity of the biological parent-ch i Id relationsh ip has been affi rmed 
time and time again 17. State intervention into the parent-child 
relationship can only occur when a court has determined that the 
parent is unfit. 18 Typically these cases involve proven allegations 
of abuse and neglect. In severe cases, the ultimate outcome is 
termination of parental rights, which ordinarily occurs after 
parents have been given the opportunity to rehabilitate them-
selves and they have failed to do so. 
19 - The difficulty of enacting the model mandatory child 
abuse reporting statute in all the American jurisdictions during 
the 1960s and 1970s was the result of the reluctance of state 
legislatures to endorse an act that interfered with the parent-child 
relationship. Ultimately, child abuse reporting statutes were 
enacted when legislators were convinced that a child's safety 
and well-being trumped the sanctity of family privacy 19. 
3. Adoption of Children 
20 - Historically, adoption of children under the age of 18 was 
considered an alternative method of establishing a family and 
thus providing for the continuation of the family's name 20 . In 
early American history, adoption was established by private 
contract and it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts made what was a private act 
a judicial proceeding where the adopted child's best interests 
were considered over the needs of the adoptive couple to have 
an heir. For over a century adoption has been the result of either 
the birth mother's voluntary relinquishment of her child, or the 
involuntary termination of the child's parents' rights and her 
placement with an adoptive couple. In the last quarter of a 
century adoption can be the result ofthe complicated process of 
assisted reproductive technologies. 
15. See Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of 
Paternity Law and Parental Status: 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y " 
34-36 (2004). 
16.491 US 110 (19B9) . 
17. See Katz, supra note 14, at 131-52. 
18. See Sanford N. Katz, When Parents Fail (1971). - See also John f.B. Meyers, 
Child Protection in America (2006). 
19.5ee Katz, supra note 14, at 140-143. 
20. See Katz, supra note 14, at 153-82. 
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21 - For over a century, adoption of children in America was 
a taboo subject and the fact that a child was adopted was rarely 
discussed even among family members. Standards for placing 
children for adoption were designed to imitate nature so that an 
adopted child would share similar external traits with her adop-
ted mother or father. This perpetuated the myth that the adopted 
child was no different from a natural born child. Indeed, intes-
tacy laws in most states reflected that myth by treating natural 
born children and adopted children alike. Both were considered 
heirs. 
22 - It was not until late in the twentieth century that the cloak 
of secrecy was lifted and in certain instances and in some Ameri-
can jurisdictions adult adopted children were allowed access to 
their birth records. In addition, and of very recent origin is the 
phenomenon of" open adoption ", which allows a birth parent 
to maintain contact with her adopted child, thus removing the 
mystery of the identity of the birth parent. Allowing a birth parent 
visitation rights with the child she has relinquished may be 
accomplished by way of a contract or by judicial order. Open 
adoption introduces a new model of adoption, which expands 
the adopted child's relationships. It is an alternative to the tradi-
tional family model of one set of parents and their children. In 
a certain sense, it is like a family where the parents of the child-
ren are divorced but the birth father has visitation rights which 
he exercises. 
23 - " Preserving the Family Through Change for the Sake of 
Future Generations », the title of this article, may seem contra-
dictory. After all we tend to think of preservation as stasis and 
change its opposite. However, it is my thesis that the family unit 
has been preserved in its current vibrancy because it has been 
allowed to be transformed in response to changing times. The 
family, as it has been defined historically - consisting of two 
opposite sex parents, and a child or children either born to those 
parents or adopted by them - may be a th i ng of the past. The new 
family may consist of one parent and her child, either born to the 
mother through a sexual relationship with a man, or conceived 
by artificial insemination. It may consist of a man and his child 
or two men and their child born through the use of a surrogate, 
or two women and a child born to one of them through artificial 
insemination or obtained through adoption. But, as the now reti -
red United States Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
noted in Troxel v. Granville 21 when she was a sitting justice: 
" [Dlemographic changes of the past century make it difficult to 
speak of an average American family. The composition of fami-
lies varies greatly from household to household " 22 . The varia-
tion among families justice O'Connor was describing in 2000 
has become even greater today. The cases discussed in this paper 
support justice O'Connor's remarks, each receiving the protec-
tion of the law and the acceptance of society. Whatever the 
family model , it should provide for the welfare of children. The 
relationships that comprise the twenty-first century family can 
provide the continuity necessary forthe survival of civilization. I 
Mots-Cles: Solidarite - Droit compare - Droit americain -
Definition de la famille 
21.530 US 57 (2000) . 
22 ./d. at 63 . 
